foreclosure - Represent Consumers

Blame game won't help distressed homeowners

There’s a big pile-on, calling for President Obama to fire the housing bureaucrat who’s blocking the latest administration housing initiative to reduce principal for underwater homeowners.

Ed DeMarco, who heads the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is a Republican holdover appointed by President Bush.

Though DeMarco is supposed to be only acting head of the agency, President Obama has never replaced him.

Now DeMarco is refusing to allow Fannie and Freddie to implement a recent initiative that would offer principal reduction to homeowners who owe more or their mortgages than their homes are worth since the housing bubble burst.

DeMarco’s position is full of holes: he’s worried that if the government doles out principal reductions to some homeowners, homeowners who don’t qualify will lower their incomes and get behind on the their mortgages just to get in line for a principal reductions. And DeMarco claims that principal reduction would be bad for taxpayers, even though his own agency’s research proves him wrong.

Lots of smart folks, including the New York Times’ Paul Krugman, are calling on the president to fire DeMarco. For Krugman and the Democrats, it’s just the latest example of Republicans blocking the President and the Democrats at every step from fixing the economy.

It’s certainly true that Republicans have done nothing themselves to get the economy going and focused solely on demonizing the president and the Democrats.

But do you remember that fiery speech the president gave blasting the presumed Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, for his do-nothing approach to the foreclosure crisis?

Do you remember the president’s strong speeches blasting Republicans’ efforts to blame the foreclosure crisis on borrowers rather than the big banks?

Neither do I.

Is it the Republicans’ fault that the president and his administration have pursued one failed strategy after another that propped up too big to fail banks while not substantially helping homeowners?

Is it Republicans’ fault that the president abandoned one of his campaign promises and failed to push for what could have been one of the most effective strategies to force intransigent banks to renegotiate with strapped borrowers – so-called judicial cram-downs of mortgage debt in bankruptcy court.

That would have allowed bankruptcy judges to reduced mortgage debt as they can other kinds of debt. But it would have accomplished the larger purpose of encouraging bankers to renegotiate with borrowers before they ever got to bankruptcy court.

Only now, after more than three years, when there is a real, live Republican to blame, has Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner come out swinging – not with aggressive new policies, but against DeMarco.

Two astute observers of government response to the foreclosure crisis, David Dayen at Firedoglake and Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism have pointed out that the Obama administration has been slow to embrace principal reduction in the first place or to convince the public that it’s needed.

In addition, the administration needs to do more to overcome another huge hurdle: under the tax law, the amount of principal reduction will be taxable when a temporary exemption expires at the end of the year.

By all means, the president should fire DeMarco. He should embrace a fight with Republicans when they try to block a permanent appointment to the post. But that should only be the beginning. He should also fire Tim Geithner, who has directly overseen so many of the administration’s previous attempts to deal with housing, which range from the merely feeble to incompetent and downright disastrous. As Neil Barofsky points out, it’s Geithner himself who has stood in the way of principal reductions previously.

If the president and the Democrats are just interested in politics, using DeMarco as a scapegoat will probably help them score some points. But if they’re serious about using principal reductions, the president needs to tackle the opposition directly and convince the public that principal reduction can be a useful tool. And President Obama needs to confront the arguments against them forcefully, whether those arguments come from foot-dragging bankers and investors or dug-in Republicans.

Foreclosures / Martin Column - 08/06/2012

Bankers' gambles – now with a bailout guaranteed

After the 2008 banks bailout, we were promised that financial reform was going to prevent future bailouts.

Never again.

But as we approach the fourth anniversary of the financial collapse, we’re learning just how hollow those promises were.

The most recent example stems from reports that regulators have secretly designated derivatives clearinghouses too big to fail in a financial emergency.

That means that in a crisis, such clearinghouses, in which risky credit default swaps are traded, would be bailed out at taxpayer expense through secret access to cheap money at the Federal Reserve’s credit window.

That’s where the big banks and the rest of corporate America lined after the 2008 to borrow trillions at low interest – with no strings attached.

The Fed didn’t require the banks to share that low interest with consumers or homeowners. The Fed didn’t require that banks make some attempt to fix the foreclosure mess. The Fed didn’t require corporations hire the unemployed or lower outrageous CEO pay.

The Fed just shoveled out the cheap loans.

Now the Fed is planning to extend that generosity, as a matter of policy, to derivative clearinghouses – which puts taxpayers directly on the hook for Wall Street’s risky gambles, like the ones that recently cost J.P. Morgan Chase $2 billion.

While those trades didn’t threaten to sink the economy, it was the unraveling of those kinds of complex gambles that tanked the economy in 2008.

Nobody knows for sure how large the derivatives market is, but the estimates are truly mind-boggling. One derivatives expert estimates that there were $1.2 quadrillion in derivatives last year – 20 times the size of the world’s economy.

While requiring these derivatives to be traded on clearinghouses is supposed to increase transparency, that assumes regulators are aggressive, diligent and understand the trades.

But signaling that these derivatives should be eligible for a bailout is nothing short of insane, at least from the taxpayers’ perspective. From the bankers’ perspective, it’s a pretty good deal, and a reassuring indication that nothing much has changed since the financial crisis: the regulators are still deep in the bankers’ pocket.

Meanwhile, the real reforms that might have a shot at actually fixing the problems and protecting our economy from the big bankers’ addiction to risk get little or no consideration in what passes for political debate.

The best step we could take is to re-impose the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, which creates walls between safe, vanilla, and consumer banking (which have traditionally been federally guaranteed, and riskier investment banking and derivatives trading But the bankers oppose Glass-Steagall, and for the present, they remain in control of both political parties and the regulators’ financial policies.

Federal Reserve / Glass-Steagel / Martin Column - 06/26/2012

That incredible shrinking foreclosure settlement

I checked in with Citibank the other day to see how they were doing on their promise to reduce principal on loans for qualified underwater borrowers.

The bank had made that promise as part of a highly touted national settlement of foreclosure fraud charges with state attorneys general back in February.

One thing the bank did not agree to, apparently, was any sense of urgency.

A bank representative told me they had taken a couple of months to get set up and were now in the process of reviewing their borrowers’ files.

He said he thought they would be done by mid-August.

One thing we know for certain: without a tough independent monitor to track what the banks are doing, and not doing, they’ll take their time to produce little help for troubled borrowers.

We know that from the banks’ past poor performance in the administration’s various foreclosure aid programs.

But now state politicians are threatening to grab the cash that banks paid as part of the settlement – money that was supposed to be used to pay monitors to oversee the banks’ compliance with the settlement, along with hiring more housing counselors that could guide homeowners to assistance where it was available and providing legal advice.

At issue is the relatively small amount of cash penalties the banks actually had to turn over in the $25 billion settlement– about $5 billion– with half of that supposed to go to state attorneys general for new foreclosure assistance.

Another $20 billion consists of a dubious and highly complex system of credits given to the banks for taking actions to help homeowners, some of which they were already supposed to be doing.

The national mortgage settlement has always been mainly a PR stunt for the state attorneys general and the Obama administration, to try to make up for their shameful collective failures to protect homeowners from the bankers’ continuing fraud and sloppiness in the foreclosure process, or to hold bankers accountable.

The investigative outfit Pro Publica delved into what they called the “billion-dollar bait and switch,” with states planning to divert $974 million from the settlement to their general funds to cover serious budge deficits arising, ironically, from the Great Recession, which was caused by the bankers’ out of control speculation.

Among those that are looting money that was supposed to be targeted at helping those facing foreclosure are states that have been particularly hard hit by foreclosures, including California and Arizona. Those states got more money from the settlement to compensate for their residents’ victimization by the biggest banks in the foreclosure process.

In California, Governor Jerry Brown now intends to use the state’s $411 million settlement proceeds to help plug a severe budget gap, in particular to pay for existing housing programs, but no new foreclosure assistance initiatives.

You would think diverting the proceeds of a legal settlement would be illegal. But apparently states have the power to raid the settlement funds, having done so in 2003 with fancy financing schemes to get state officials’ hands on funds that were supposed to be targeted for health care costs from a 1998 settlement with tobacco companies, the San Francisco Chronicle reported.

State budget problems brought on by the 2008 financial collapse are enormous, but no more compelling than the continuing failure of our elected officials to grapple with the foreclosure crisis. That failure is now underscored by the hollow ring of the state AGs’ promises, and compounded by governors’ betrayal of those promises.

California Attorney General Kamala Harris / Foreclosures / Martin Column - 06/01/2012

What's the `worst CEO' worth?

Why did the nation’s largest pension fund take a strong stance against Citibank’s excessive CEO compensation, but then turn around and vote for Bank of America’s lesser, but still outrageous, pay plan?

The California pension fund, CalPERS, was among the 92 percent of shareholders who went along with Bank of America in an advisory vote on CEO compensation earlier this week. In Wednesday’s vote, CalPERs did vote for measures that would have required disclosure on B of A’s lobbying activities as well an independent review of the bank’s foreclosure actions.

While But Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan faced noisy protests and pointed questions at the bank’s annual meeting in Charlotte, N.C, both of those initiatives, like say on pay, were defeated.

In their nonbinding “say on pay” vote, Bank of America shareholders approved a $7 million 2011 pay package for Moynihan. Last month, 55 percent of Citibank’s shareholders, including CalPERS, voted against a 15 percent pay hike for their CEO, Vikram Pandit, who had been getting along on $1 a year in 2009 and 2010 while Citibank floundered.

CalPERS’ position this week is strangely at odds with its previous positions.

In the past, CalPERS has been has been particularly tough on Bank of America. In 2010, it cast an unusual vote against all of the bank’s directors, including then-CEO Ken Lewis.

Asked for comment on Wednesday’s Bank of America CalPERS vote, a spokesperson referred me to the pension board’s 79-page governing principles, specifically the provisions covering executive compensation. CalPERS declined to answer any questions about why the pension fund voted for Moynihan’s compensation fund, but against Citibank’s.

True, Moynihan’s pay is less ($7 million) than Pandit’s ($15 million), but that doesn’t make either of them acceptable, much less understandable, by anything but the tortured logic of the too big to fail, government-coddled banks.

To approve Moynihan’s pay, shareholders had to overlook mountains of evidence that the bank is on the wrong track. Back in October, the bank retreated on a scheme to soak its customers for a $5 a month fee on debit cards after President Obama blasted it. The bank, which Bloomberg News estimates received more than $1.5 billion in federal bailout aid, has repeatedly been the target of criticism for underperforming in voluntary government loan modification programs. Earlier this year, B of A was among the big banks that settled foreclosure fraud charges with the feds and states attorney general. Though it was touted as $25 billion settlement, it actually only cost the banks $5 billion. But the bank fraud it highlighted was real.

Richard Eskow of Campaign For America’s Future outlined Moynihan’s dark career trajectory, from B of A general counsel to head of its retail division to CEO, while the bank completed its disastrous $2.5 billion acquisition of slimy subprime lending king Countrywide. When Moynihan joined senior management the bank’s stock traded around $52 a share. Today it trades around $7 or $8 a share.

Tallying the eventual costs of the Countrywide acquisition, Eskow includes a massive $8.4 billion settlement with states over illegal behavior, $600 million to settle a class action suit, $335 million to settle a discrimination suit and $50 to $55 million for its part of lawsuits against Countrywide’s former CEO.

One bank analyst, Michael Mayo, recently ranked the worst CEOs. Moynihan was at the top of the list (with Citibank’s Pandit not far behind). Mayo cited the stock slide along with the debit card fee debacle and the bank’s failure to stem its foreclosure fraud and mortgage servicing problems.

Eskow hits the nail on the head when he asks: By what standard does Moynihan still have a job, let alone a multimillion-dollar salary?

And by what standard does he merit a vote of confidence by CalPERS, which less than a month earlier had taken a strong stand against excessive pay for another failed bank executive, Pandit?

Especially after the pension fund’s chief investment fund officer, Joe Dear, vowed after the Citibank vote to get even more activist. “Excessive CEO pay is not in the interest of the shareowners and not in the interest of companies,” Dear told CNNMoney.

CalPERS has long been an advocate for improved corporate governance, but its credibility has sagged after it suffered staggering losses in the financial collapse and was caught in its own sleazy “pay to play” scandal.

CalPERS’ Bank of America’s vote leaves unanswered questions about the pension fund’s claims to increased activism. Did CalPERS single out Citibank because that was the only too-big-to-fail bank to fail its latest government stress test, as U.S News and World Report suggested?

Or could the vote have something to do with the confidential settlement last November of a lawsuit CalPERS and 15 other institutional investors filed against Bank of America? Could CalPERS officials have agreed to back off their previous hard line against the Bank of America board as part of a secret deal the public will never see?

Of course, we don’t know details – the settlement is sealed.

Was Citibank a publicity-grabbing one-off, or did the pension fund give Bank of America a bye? We’ll have to wait and see just exactly what CalPERS means by activism when it comes to challenging the pampered, powerful titans of the nation’s too big to fail banks.

For now, all we can do is paraphrase the classic film portraying of the lack of accountability of corrupt power, `Chinatown’:

“Forget it Jake, it’s Wall Street.”

Bank of America (BoA) / CalPERS / Citibank / Executive Pay / Martin Column - 05/11/2012

No-fault settlement fuels never-ending bailout

Two striking details reveal the true nature of the highly touted national foreclosure settlement.

The first is that the banks admit no wrongdoing.

Here’s a sample of the illegality and the misconduct with which the federal authorities and the 49 state attorneys general charged the banks. It goes way beyond robo-signing, the banks’ widespread practice of using forged or unverified documents in the foreclosure process:

▪ Providing false or misleading information to borrowers,

▪ Overcharging borrowers and investors for services of dubious value,

▪ Denying relief to eligible borrowers,

▪ Foreclosing on borrowers who were pursuing loan modifications,

▪ Submitting forged or fraudulent documents and making false statements in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings

▪ Losing or destroying promissory notes and deeds of trust,

▪ Lying to borrowers about the reasons for denying their loan modifications,

▪ Signing affidavits without personal knowledge and under false identities,

▪ Improperly charging excessive fees related to foreclosures

▪ Foreclosing on service members on active duty

▪ Making false claims to the government for insurance coverage

But the feds and the state attorneys general want to let the banks off the hook without having to admit to any of it.

This is the kind of no-fault settlement for which the Securities and Exchange Commission has increasingly come under fire, [but which companies agree to as a cost of doing business. For example, the national foreclosure settlement only costs the banks about $5 billion in real money, a drop in the bucket compared to their profits. It’s not enough to actually deter the banks from future bad conduct.

The rest of its estimated $25 billion value is supposed to be determined by a complex series of credits that the bankers get for what they should be doing anyway – modifying mortgage loans and offering principal reductions to underwater homeowners.

The authorities still have to get a judge in Washington, D.C. to sign off on it.

Too bad the settlement wasn’t presented to U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in New York, who’s been adamant in questioning no-fault settlements and refusing to rubber stamp them.

His comments, though directed at the SEC, are relevant to the national foreclosure settlement.

Rejecting an SEC no-fault settlement with Citigroup last November, Judge Rakoff said that such settlements are “hallowed by history, but not by reason” and create the potential for abuse because they ask “the court to employ its power and assert its authority when it does not know the facts.”

Rakoff questioned what government officials would get from the settlement “other than a quick headline.”

Though he was talking about an SEC settlement with Citigroup, he could have been describing the national foreclosure settlement, which exacts too little a price from banks for their wrongdoing and offers too little to homeowners.

The settlement provides that banks will spend $17 billion on principal reductions and another $3 billion on refinancings. But according to an analysis by the Brooking Institute’s Ted Gayer, less than 5 percent of the nation’s 11.1 million homeowners will qualify for help under the settlement.

It also presents the general laundry list of wrongdoing without any specificity – it names no names or specific facts. One of the big criticisms of the foreclosure settlement is that the authorities didn’t do a real law-enforcement style investigation to assemble a case before sitting down to “negotiate” the settlement, weakening their hand with the banks.

The second aspect of the foreclosure settlement that reveals its weakness is how the authorities are suggesting they’re going to monitor whether the banks will comply. Just exactly how are we going to make sure that the big banks deliver even the relatively small number of loan modifications and principal reductions they’ve promised?

According to the settlement, the banks themselves are going to self-report on their progress.

Then an “independent” monitoring committee is going to check these reports, and then levy fines if the banks aren’t hitting certain targets. But the monitors consist of the same regulators who have already facilitated the banks’ earlier failed foreclosure mitigation efforts, and have touted this current settlement as a “landmark.” Having already proved their reluctance to get tough on the banks so far, how much incentive do they have to get tough with banks later on?

It sounds flaky to me.

The whole robo-signing scandal stems from banks use of forged, false or unverified documents, poor recordkeeping and the inability of anybody in the courts or government to get the banks to follow the law or hold them accountable.

On top of that, when it comes to keeping their previous commitments to deliver loan modifications in earlier attempts to address the foreclosure crisis, the banks have failed miserably. The investigative journalism outfit Pro Publica has assembled reams of data about the shortcomings of previous government-sponsored loan modification efforts.

So now we think it’s a good idea for them to police themselves?

The entire settlement looks more like the government’s latest efforts to prop up the nation’s floundering too big to fail banks than a real attempt at either law enforcement or robust help for homeowners and the housing market.

Where is Judge Rakoff when we really need him?

Foreclosure / Martin Column / Outrage / Too Big To Fail - 03/14/2012

A "landmark" we still can't see

For the most part, the big media and housing nonprofits have bought the government’s hype on the recent foreclosure fraud settlement, lauding it with great fanfare as a historic landmark.

It’s a good thing that not all our national landmarks are as phony as that settlement has turned out to be.

If they were, none of them would still be standing.

If big media had taken a more objective view, rather than just copying the authorities’ press releases, they might have chosen another, much less dramatic description, such as “yet to be released.”

The best description might take a few more words: “designed to make the Obama administration and state attorneys general look like they’re doing something while letting banks off the hook and leaving homeowners out in the cold and taxpayers and investors holding the bag.”

The settlement continues to raise more questions than it answers. For example, California’s attorney general Kamala Harris announced that the state would get $18 billion in foreclosure relief from the national settlement.

But then a couple of days later, Jeff Collins of the Orange County Register reported that Harris hadn’t offered a complete explanation.

As it turns out, the state might get only $12 billion.

The amount, Harris’ people explained to Collins, depends on which of two methods you used to calculate it.

“There are two sets of numbers,” said Linda Gledhill, a Harris spokeswoman told Collins.

Hah! Who knew?

One method calculates the cost of the settlement to banks, which as explained in the settlement’s “executive summary” are required to provide $25.2 billion in a variety of forms of assistance to borrowers. But providing that assistance doesn’t actually cost them $25 billion.

Apparently the settlement only requires the banks to pay out $5 billion in cash, with the balance consisting of a yet to be released complex system of credits that the the government will give the banks credit for offering the assistance, with details yet to be announced.

Meanwhile, the Financial Times (registration required) has been parsing the sparse publicly available details about the settlement. Their prognosis: The settlement shifts the costs of modifying mortgages from the banks to the taxpayers and to investors who bought securitized mortgages. As a result, it resembles another bailout more than it does a settlement.

Neil Barofsky, the former Inspector-General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program told the FT:

“If the banks are doing something under this settlement, and cash flows from taxpayers to the banks, that is fundamentally an upside-down result.”

And keep in mind that the actual settlement agreement still hasn’t been released yet, more than ten days after it was announced. What exactly is the hangup?

Do the authorities really expect us to take their word for it? How gullible do they think we are?

Remember how the 2008 bank bailout started: a three-page document submitted by the treasury secretary.

As my colleague Harvey Rosenfield warned when the President first announced the settlement, we’ll be in for a lot of surprises when the actual settlement is actually released, whenever that will be.

And something tells me they won’t be the good kind of surprises.

California Attorney General Kamala Harris / Foreclosure / Martin Column / President Barack Obama / SIGTARP - 02/22/2012

Task Force Deja Vu

MoveOn.org and other groups are declaring President Obama’s announcement of a new task force to investigate foreclosure fraud a significant victory.

These groups deserve credit and thanks for mobilizing people to call the White House and state attorneys general and organizing protests to push back against a weak proposed settlement of foreclosure fraud charges against big banks, without having first fully investigated the allegations.

But before we get too carried away with the celebrations, I think it’s worth examining the president’s announcement with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Because we’ve heard it all before.

In 2009, the Obama administration convened, with great fanfare, the “”Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force,” which included officials from the Justice Department, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Announcing the task force, U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder said it mission was to the mission was to prosecute the financial fraud that led to the 2008 economic collapse.

“Mortgages, securities and corporate fraud schemes have eroded the public's confidence in the nation's financial markets and have led to a growing sentiment that Wall Street does not play by the same rules as Main Street,” Holder said.

State attorneys general then formed their own mortgage fraud working group to work with federal authorities.

These previous efforts haven’t produced noteworthy results – no criminal charges have been brought against major bank executives, and no major policy changes have been put in place to force banks to help homeowners.

The 2009 task force was not exactly targeting the titans of Wall Street. As these high-profile task forces like to do, this one gave its “operations” hokey names like Operation Stolen Dreams and Operation Broken Trust that make everybody but the prosecutors cringe.

Touting Operation Broken Dreams in 2010, prosecutors bragged that it had netted 330 convictions related to mortgage fraud – but it focused on borrower, not bank fraud. While Operation Broken Trust focused on investment fraud, among its 343 criminal cases, it focused on lower-level fraudsters.

There was not a single case against a Wall Street banker.

While prosecutors often build cases against higher-ups using those lower in the food chain, that doesn’t seem to be the case with the 2009 task force.

In other words, the 2009 task force hasn’t done anything that would interfere with the flow of political contributions from Wall Street.

Evaluating the task force’s work, the Columbia Journalism Review found it more publicity stunt that real prosecution effort.

Meanwhile, the state AG’s efforts stirred MoveOn.org and other organizations to action. A handful of state AGs are balking at the inadequate proposed settlement, and California’s attorney general, Kamala Harris has joined with Nevada’s attorney general in walking away from the proposed settlement and pledging a real investigation into the foreclosure mess.

There are plenty of other reasons to be skeptical of the President’s newly- anointed task force, rounded up here by Dave Dayen on Firedoglake. While one of its co-chairs, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, appears to be the genuine deal in his intention to crack down on financial crime, he’s being babysat (co-chaired) by two administration lawyers with dubious backgrounds when it comes to getting tough on bankers.

Robert Khuzami, head of enforcement at the SEC, used to be general counsel at Deutsche Bank, overseeing its huge risky investments in mortgages. Shouldn’t Deutsch Bank be a prime target of the task force?

At the SEC, he’s presided over several settlements that appeared to be overly generous to banks. Another other co-chair is the head of Justice’s criminal division, Lanny Breuer, who has been apologist in chief for the agency’s lack of aggressiveness in going after too big to fail bankers.

As a private lawyer, Breuer worked at the Washington D.C. law firm Covington & Burling, which represented too big to fail banks Bank of America, Well Fargo, Citgroup and JPMorgan Chase as well as MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Service, a concoction of the real estate finance industry that runs a vast computerized registry of mortgages that has been at the center of complaints about false and fraudulent documents in the foreclosure process.

Breuer and Khuzami both played prominent roles in the president’s previous financial fraud task force, as members of its securities and commodities fraud working group.

The bottom line is that the new task force is only needed because of the abject failure of the administration’s previous efforts to prosecute the fraud at the heart of the financial meltdown.

According to statistics gathered by Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, despite all the prosecutors’ puffery about their inanely named operations, financial fraud prosecutions fell to a 20-year low in 2011, continuing a decade-long downward trend.

If this new task force is not going to be a fraud itself, Khuzami and Breuer have to go. They should be replaced by real prosecutors without close ties to the big bankers.

Though you wouldn’t know it from the Obama administration, people like that do exist.

Blogger Abigail Field nominates two crackerjacks – Neil Barofsky, the tough former inspector general of the bailout, and Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. attorney for the northern district of Illinois, who has successfully pursued several high-profile cases, including the perjury conviction of Scooter Libby, former VP Dick Cheney’s chief of staff.

So after you finish that glass of champagne celebrating the new task force, it’s time to get back on the phone. Here’s the president’s number.

Tell the president we don’t need another task force. We need prosecutors who aren’t compromised and who aren’t afraid to do their jobs.

California Attorney General Kamala Harris / Foreclosures / Martin Column / President Barack Obama / Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - 01/27/2012

Stop Forecclosuregate Bailout

Is President Obama going to try to sell us another bank bailout in his State of the Union address tonight?

Of course, he won't call it a bailout. He'll tout it as “the largest multi-state settlement of charges of wrongdoing against corporate malefactors in history;” something that sounds important and unprecedented.

But don’t be fooled, a bailout is exactly what Obama administration officials are scheming, under the guise of settling foreclosure fraud charges against the big banks.

The fraud stems from widespread robo-signing in which banks used forged documents or had employees sign off on documents they hadn’t read.

The Obama administration has been pressuring state attorneys general to end a joint federal-state investigation with a sweetheart deal that would amount to another bailout for the banks – rewarding them again for their bad behavior, this time with a light slap on the wrist.

Unlike in 2008, we know a lot more about how government officials under the influence of Wall Street misbehave. When administration officials met privately with state AGs Monday in Chicago, they were met with protestors, and a number of groups have been mobilizing phone calls to the White House and state AGs.

Let me give you some perspective: Banks have made hundreds of billions off the adjustable, high-interest loans they pawned off on borrowers, then sliced and diced and resold to investors until the bankers’ shenanigans sank our economy. Now the Obama administration wants to settle with them for between $19 and $25 billion in fines. Some of that money could be sent directly to 750,000 borrowers who were found to be victims of robo-signing. But there haven’t any thorough investigations to determine the full scope of that scandal or how many people were actually effected. Part of the money could be used to reduce principal (by a piddling $20,000) for a small number of homeowners, and some could be used to pay housing counselors, who provide advice for people facing foreclosure.

But as in previous foreclosure reduction efforts and previous settlements with the banks, enforcement and accountability are completely lacking.

And while $19 to $25 billion may sound like a lot of money to us, to the bankers, it’s pocket change: It’s neither punitive nor a deterrent.

This foreclosure deal is so bad that Kamala Harris, the California AG who is a close ally of the president’s, walked away from it, promising instead to join with Nevada’s AG to scrutinize the bankers’ foreclosure practices more closely.

In doing so, Harris is behaving like real law enforcement official, not a bank apologist. Like any prosecutor, she knows she has to have solid evidence in hand before she talks about a plea bargain.

A handful of other state AGs are expressing skepticism about the proposed settlement, but the Obama administration continues to pressure the AGs to settle before the banks’ behavior is fully investigated and understood.

As MIT economist and Baseline Scenario blogger Simon Johnson told Dave Dayen at Firedoglake, “Why go small when you have a strong case for fraud?”

Harris isn’t the only one who walked away from what she saw as a shabby deal for her constituents. The New York AG, Eric Schneiderman also balked, and when he started to question the deal, he was booted off the negotiating committee. What particularly disturbed Schneiderman was the notion that as part of a proposed settlement, banks would get immunity from lawsuits, not only relating to robo-signing, but for other mortgage-related fraud as well.

“I wasn't willing to provide a release that ... released conduct that hadn't been investigated, essentially,” Schneiderman told National Public Radio. Schneiderman has started his own investigation.

Initially the joint state-federal investigation looked like it had teeth. Back in 2010 when the process began, Tom Miller, the Iowa AG who headed the multi-state task force, stated bluntly: “We will put people in jail.”

What happened?

Remember what Deep Throat told investigative reporters Woodward and Bernstein during Watergate: Follow the money.

After Miller launched that initial investigation of the banks’ foreclosure practices, he raised $261,445 from finance, insurance and real estate interests – more than 88 times as much as he’d raised before the investigation. Not all that much money in the scheme of things, but apparently enough to inspire him to back off. Now Miller is leading the settlement juggernaut.

Where we see fraud, our leaders see financial opportunity.

We can’t let Miller and the Obama administration let the banks off the hook again at our expense. We want thorough, transparent investigations and indictments where appropriate.

Please call the White House today and tell them that if it walks like a bailout and quacks like a bailout, we’ll know it’s a bailout, no matter how administration officials try to dress it up.

And we don't want any more bailouts.

Foreclosure / Martin Column / President Barack Obama - 01/24/2012

For foreclosure relief, occupy the Legislature

Two years ago, California legislators bowed to bankers when they failed to pass legislation that would require mediation between a bank and borrower before banks could foreclose on the borrower’s home.

But a recent report by the U.S. Justice Department should cause the Legislature to take another crack at making a critical choice: Do they want to provide tools to reduce foreclosures, or do they want to keep kowtowing to bankers?

California remains among the hardest hit by foreclosures: third worst in the country.

While foreclosure rates are going down nationally, that’s more a reflection of the continuing mess in the foreclosure process itself rather than any fundamental restoration of health in the housing market.

So the problem hasn’t gone away by itself.

Federal efforts to help homeowners have been ineffective because they’re voluntary for the banks, with inadequate government oversight. For the feds, foreclosure reduction efforts have consisted mainly of offering banks modest incentives for loan modifications, incentives that are less than the profit the bank, in its role as loan servicer, makes from foreclosing on homes.

As demonstrated by the California legislators’ previous refusal to embrace mediation, government officials at all levels have so far lacked the political will to force banks to take the action needed to stem foreclosures. Two years ago, Assemblyman Pedro Nava spearheaded the foreclosure mediation effort, AB 1639, which passed the Assembly but died in the Senate under fierce banking opposition. Consultant on the bill was Los Angeles mediator Laurel Kaufer, chair of the State Bar's ADR committee.

Around the country, there have been a host of mediation programs around the country, with mixed results. ¶

Programs in Connecticut and Philadelphia successfully settled about three of every four cases, avoiding foreclosures. In Nevada, officials reported that about 42 percent of the cases in mediation settled without foreclosure. Nevada also reported another significant finding – the banks dropped many of the foreclosure attempts during the mediation process because there paperwork wasn’t in order.

But in late December, the Florida Supreme Court closed down its foreclosure mediation program after state officials determined it wasn’t working because so few cases eligible for mediation ended in settlement.

Then, just a couple of weeks later, the U.S. Justice Department issued a promising report calling for wider federal use of mediation in foreclosure and more research into how well it works.

The details of foreclosure mediation programs vary widely. The most successful programs, the Justice Department explained, are those that begin early in the foreclosure process, require mandatory participation, include some form of financial counseling for homeowners, are well publicized and require a high degree of transparency by the banks – meaning that banks have to disclose how their foreclosure process works, including the secretive, often confusing criteria by which they grant loan modifications.

Will the feds blow this opportunity to attack the foreclosure crisis, as they bungled their earlier efforts? Or will finally get a clue and start taking effective action?

In California, we shouldn’t wait to find out.

This Justice Department report should give a boost to a renewed effort to require mediation in California foreclosures, and offers some guidance to California in how to create a successful mediation program.

But it will only happen if people mobilize against the banking lobby, which is sure to oppose any attempt to weaken bankers’ complete control over the foreclosure process.

We keep hearing how the Occupy movement has changed the debate, how issues that couldn’t gain traction six months ago can now get a fuller hearing. We should seize the opportunity to give legislators the opportunity to get the bankers off our backs.

Foreclosures / Martin Column - 01/18/2012

Mr. President, Keep Your Promise

President Obama got generally high marks earlier this month for “getting it” after he struck a populist tone in his speech at Osawatomie, the Kansas town where he evoked the progressive spirit of former president Teddy Roosevelt.

But if he really wants to do something about the economic pain Americans continue to suffer, the president could start by keeping a campaign promise he made – to lead a fight to reform bankruptcy laws to allow judges to modify mortgage loans in their courts.

Under heavy pressure from bankers, the Senate defeated such a proposal in 2009, while the president and his administration remained silent on the sidelines.

At the time, Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin said bitterly, referring to Congress, the big banks “frankly own the place.”

The administration’s refusal to address the foreclosure crisis remains one of the sorriest aspects of its consistent underestimation of the depth of the economic crisis.

Earlier this month, the non-profit investigative journalism outfit Pro Publica filled in the details on how the administration pooped out on the president’s campaign promise. It turns out that many on the president’s bank-friendly economic team were never enthusiastic about cram-down.

The idea behind judicial cram-downs is to treat mortgage debt the same as other debts which bankruptcy judges are permitted to reduce as part of a bankruptcy.

The impact would be to encourage bankers to reduce principal on mortgages before they ever got to bankruptcy court. Judicial cram-down would be far more effective than the Obama administration’s previous failed programs intended to address the foreclosure crisis, which offered banks insufficient incentives to voluntarily modify loans with inadequate government oversight.

Part of the reason the president can’t hammer the Republicans for their lack of any plan to address foreclosures is that he hasn’t come up with a decent plan of his own – and that he didn’t fight hard enough for a solution like cram-down, which lost by six votes in the Senate, including 12 members of the president’s own party.

In addition, 11 Republicans who represent states among the hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis also voted against cram-down.

Couldn’t a tougher, savvier, more committed fight by the president come up with the seven or so votes needed to win this fight?

As the president takes on the big banks. he may take encouragement from these words from the predecessor he evoked so successfully at Osawatomie:

“The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.”

Foreclosure / Martin Column / President Barack Obama - 12/28/2011