For bailed-out executives, the gravy train never ends

How many bailed-out executives does it take to screw the American taxpayer?

Not many, when they have the kind of phony oversight the Treasury Department has been providing for the companies we bailed The latest report by the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)  - known to the rest of us as the Wall Street bailout –  portrays the Treasury Department’s bailout  overseers as more concerned with coddling corporate titans than they were with protecting taxpayers – even though excessive compensation was a main cause of bankers’ reckless risk-taking in the first place by rewarding short-term performance rather than more sustainable long-term gains.

The damning IG report, issued January 28, outlines a pattern of the Treasury Department’s  acting pay czar, Patricia Geoghegan, approving excessive compensation for the corporate executives who took public funds while ignoring previous recommendations from the special IG’s office to implement polices to restrain their pay.

Treasury’s continuing approval of the excessive salaries contradicts President Obama’s vow to rein in bank pay in the wake of bankers’ outrageous bonuses after the bailout. “It does offend our values when executives of big financial firms that are struggling pay themselves huge bonuses even as they rely on extraordinary assistance to stay afloat,” the president said in 2009.

Geoghegan, a retired lawyer for the white-shoe Wall Street corporate law firm Cravath, Swain & Moore, justified her approvals for three companies, AIG, GM and Ally Financial Inc., citing the companies’ concerns [for losing the executives while they worked to get their firms out of debt to the TARP program as quickly as possible. rephrase] AIG has since paid back its TARP money; GM and Ally remain in the program.

Geoghegan approved huge pay hikes for executives overseeing units of the companies that were not doing well – and even going bankrupt.

While her predecessor set guidelines that barred cash salaries at the bailed-out firms  exceeding $500,000 except for good cause, the IG found that Treasury in 2012 approved salaries of $3 million or more for 54 percent of the top 69 bailed-out bank executives, while another 23 percent got salaries of $5 million or more.

 

In her report, the special inspector general, Christy Romero concluded: “While taxpayers struggle to overcome the recent financial crisis and look to the U.S. Government to put a lid on compensation for executives of firms whose missteps nearly crippled the U.S. financial system, the U.S. Department of the Treasury continues to allow excessive executive pay.”

Rather than develop her own analysis of the company’s request for compensation, Geoghegan merely parroted what the company said to her. According to the report, “[Geoghegan’s decisions] were largely driven by the companies’ pay proposals, the same companies that historically, and again in 2012, proposed excessive pay, failing to appreciate the extraordinary situation they were in, with taxpayers funding and partially owning them.”

If the pay czar won’t question the firms’ salaries request, “who else will protect the taxpayers?” Romero asked.

Obviously not the Treasury Department, which was given a chance to address the Inspector General’s criticisms. In its written response, the Treasury Department disagreed with the IG’s findings and conclusions and did not agree to implement any of its recommendations.

The Treasury Department shouldn’t be allowed to thumb its nose at taxpayers in such a flagrant manner, or at the president’s clearly stated wishes. Or does Treasury’s cave-in to the bankers indicate that President Obama changed his mind?

We should demand that Congress conduct a thorough and public investigation into who thwarted the president’s efforts to scale back pay at bailed-out firms.

A great place to start would be contacting the members of the Senate Banking Committee to demand they look into it.

 

A "landmark" we still can't see

For the most part, the big media and housing nonprofits have bought the government’s hype on the recent foreclosure fraud settlement, lauding it with great fanfare as a historic landmark.

It’s a good thing that not all our national landmarks are as phony as that settlement has turned out to be.

If they were, none of them would still be standing.

If big media had taken a more objective view, rather than just copying the authorities’ press releases, they might have chosen another, much less dramatic description, such as “yet to be released.”

The best description might take a few more words: “designed to make the Obama administration and state attorneys general look like they’re doing something while letting banks off the hook and leaving homeowners out in the cold and taxpayers and investors holding the bag.”

The settlement continues to raise more questions than it answers. For example, California’s attorney general Kamala Harris announced that the state would get $18 billion in foreclosure relief from the national settlement.

But then a couple of days later, Jeff Collins of the Orange County Register reported that Harris hadn’t offered a complete explanation.

As it turns out, the state might get only $12 billion.

The amount, Harris’ people explained to Collins, depends on which of two methods you used to calculate it.

“There are two sets of numbers,” said Linda Gledhill, a Harris spokeswoman told Collins.

Hah! Who knew?

One method calculates the cost of the settlement to banks, which as explained in the settlement’s “executive summary” are required to provide $25.2 billion in a variety of forms of assistance to borrowers. But providing that assistance doesn’t actually cost them $25 billion.

Apparently the settlement only requires the banks to pay out $5 billion in cash, with the balance consisting of a yet to be released complex system of credits that the the government will give the banks credit for offering the assistance, with details yet to be announced.

Meanwhile, the Financial Times (registration required) has been parsing the sparse publicly available details about the settlement. Their prognosis: The settlement shifts the costs of modifying mortgages from the banks to the taxpayers and to investors who bought securitized mortgages. As a result, it resembles another bailout more than it does a settlement.

Neil Barofsky, the former Inspector-General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program told the FT:

“If the banks are doing something under this settlement, and cash flows from taxpayers to the banks, that is fundamentally an upside-down result.”

And keep in mind that the actual settlement agreement still hasn’t been released yet, more than ten days after it was announced. What exactly is the hangup?

Do the authorities really expect us to take their word for it? How gullible do they think we are?

Remember how the 2008 bank bailout started: a three-page document submitted by the treasury secretary.

As my colleague Harvey Rosenfield warned when the President first announced the settlement, we’ll be in for a lot of surprises when the actual settlement is actually released, whenever that will be.

And something tells me they won’t be the good kind of surprises.

Happy Talk

Treasury officials and many politicians are busy patting themselves on the back because the Troubled Asset Relief Program will end up costing taxpayers less then expected.

The way these folks describe it the TARP and other aspects of the federal bailout were just supposed to function as a loan program for the banks while they were having some trouble.

TARP is also winning praise for having “restored trust” in our financial system.

Beyond the scary rhetoric that gave birth to the bailout and self-congratulatory sermons it’s being buried with, the bailout consisted of a set of rules and a way of picking winners and losers in the economic crisis that did anything but build trust.

Remember when the Fed chair, Ben Bernanke, insisted that he was a Main Street guy, that he was interested in the financial system only inasmuch as it helped out Main Street?

But the bailout institutionalized a system where the government could only afford to bail out the biggest bankers and corporate officials while abandoning smaller banks and business owners along with millions of troubled homeowners and vulnerable employees.

As Fortune’s Alan Sloane wrote, “the more bailout rocks you turn over, the more well-connected players you find who aren't being forced to pay the full price of their mistakes.”

Oh well, the apologists say, nothing’s perfect. It could have been so much worse.

One official who hasn’t joined in the festivities is Neil Barofsky, the former special inspector for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, who bid the bailout a scathing farewell in the New York Times, which you can read here.

The Obama administration and bailout apologists would like to have us believe that it was just a necessary first stage of the recovery to ensure that the bankers stayed rich and the wealthiest Americans’ increasing share of the nation’s wealth kept on growing.

But in Barofsky’s view, there was nothing inevitable about the no-strings attached bailout that filled the bankers’ pockets while offering little to Main Street. It had nothing to do with the operation of the free market either. It was very carefully crafted by public officials working hand in hand with Wall Street to maintain its power while gnawing away at the increasingly fragile livelihoods of ordinary Americans.

As Barofsky notes, “Treasury officials refuse to address these shortfalls. Instead they continue to 
stubbornly maintain that the program is a success and needs no 
material change, effectively assuring that Treasury's most specific 
Main Street promise will not be honored.”

And while recent employment gains are welcome news, Dean Baker points out the losers – African-Americans among whom unemployment remains distressing high and wage earners in general, whose pay is not keeping up with inflation.

The bailout celebration is just part of the happy talk designed to buoy the notion that the recovery is well underway. But this bailout-fueled recovery continues to pick highly predictable winners – with the powerful, wealthy and politically connected doing swimmingly while everybody else just limps along.

 

 

Quotable: Neil Barofsky

"Even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car."

Neil Barofsky, January 2010

Bailout Beat Might Be His Last

Most of official Washington operates in a state of slow-mo lethargy when it comes to working on financial reform.

Not Neil Barofsky, who is saddled with the cumbersome acronym SIGTARP.

That stands for Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, also known as the federal bailout.

He’s a one-time federal prosecutor who in his former life prosecuted Colombian drug gangs and white-collar criminals.

As one Republican senator told him when Barofsky got the inspector general’s job, if he did his job properly, he’d never be able to get another.

Barofsky seems to have taken it to heart.

Last week, along with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, he filed suit against former top Bank of America officials, charging them with fraud for concealing how bad Merrill-Lynch’s losses were from B of A’s own stockholders while B of A was in the process of acquiring Merrill during the melt-down.

Barofsky also recently launched an investigation into the shady federal bailout of AIG and its counterparties, including Goldman-Sachs.

Meanwhile his regular quarterly reports to Congress continue to pack a punch. He has consistently warned against the administration’s rosy predictions of how taxpayers will benefit from TARP.

He’s focused instead on the continuing dangers of doing nothing to rewrite the rigged rules of the financial game that favor bankers’ bonuses and betting with taxpayers’ money over the interests of consumers and homeowners.

“Even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008,” Barofsky wrote in his most recent report, “absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car.”

In fact, the whole focus on whether taxpayers are getting “paid back” is a smokescreen for TARP’s failures. While the administration has touted banks’ repayments of their TARP money, the repayments are backfiring on the administration, giving it less leverage over the banks. Released from their TARP obligations, the banks are free to return to lavishly rewarding their employees for risky trades that rack up short-term profits.

Barofsky, writing in plain language that consumers and concerned citizens can understand, states that while the TARP program stabilized the financial system, it hasn’t met most of its other goals. “Lending continues to decrease, month after month, and the TARP program designed specifically to address small-business lending — announced in March 2009 — has still not been implemented by Treasury,” Barofsky wrote in the January 30 report. “The TARP foreclosure prevention program has only permanently modified a small fraction of eligible mortgages, and unemployment is the highest it has been in a generation.”

Barofsky was appointed by Congress to monitor TARP. Yet Congress has done nothing to hold the current administration accountable for the bailout’s failures. Meanwhile the Senate continues to pursue what appears to be its quest to squelch reform, in direct contradiction of what a majority of Americans want. Specifically Sen. Christopher Dodd appears to be on the brink of negotiating away a stand-alone Consumer Financial Protection Agency, a linchpin of President Obama’s reform plan. The financial industry fiercely opposes such an agency.

Contact your representative and senator today and let them know you support Barofsky’s strong work on TARP. While you’re at it, let your senator know you’re paying attention to the battle over financial reform, and that they should start paying attention to the will of the majority instead of the bank lobbyists.