No-fault settlement fuels never-ending bailout

Two striking details reveal the true nature of the highly touted national foreclosure settlement.

The first is that the banks admit no wrongdoing.

Here’s a sample of the illegality and the misconduct with which the federal authorities and the 49 state attorneys general charged the banks. It goes way beyond robo-signing, the banks’ widespread practice of using forged or unverified documents in the foreclosure process:

▪                Providing false or misleading information to borrowers,

▪                Overcharging borrowers and investors for services of dubious value,

▪                Denying relief to eligible borrowers,

▪                Foreclosing on borrowers who were pursuing loan modifications,

▪                Submitting forged or fraudulent documents and making false statements in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings

▪                Losing or destroying promissory notes and deeds of trust,

▪                Lying to borrowers about the reasons for denying their loan modifications,

▪                Signing affidavits without personal knowledge and under false identities,

▪                Improperly charging excessive fees related to foreclosures

▪                Foreclosing on service members on active duty

▪                Making false claims to the government for insurance coverage

But the feds and the state attorneys general want to let the banks off the hook without having to admit to any of it.

This is the kind of no-fault settlement for which the Securities and Exchange Commission has increasingly come under fire, [but which companies agree to as a cost of doing business. For example, the national foreclosure settlement only costs the banks about $5 billion in real money, a drop in the bucket compared to their profits. It’s not enough to actually deter the banks from future bad conduct.

The rest of its estimated $25 billion value is supposed to be determined by a complex series of credits that the bankers get for what they should be doing anyway – modifying mortgage loans and offering principal reductions to underwater homeowners.

The authorities still have to get a judge in Washington, D.C. to sign off on it.

Too bad the settlement wasn’t presented to U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in New York, who’s been adamant in questioning no-fault settlements and refusing to rubber stamp them.

His comments, though directed at the SEC, are relevant to the national foreclosure settlement.

Rejecting an SEC no-fault settlement with Citigroup last November, Judge Rakoff said that such settlements are “hallowed by history, but not by reason” and create the potential for abuse because they ask “the court to employ its power and assert its authority when it does not know the facts.”

Rakoff questioned what government officials would get from the settlement “other than a quick headline.”

Though he was talking about an SEC settlement with Citigroup, he could have been describing the national foreclosure settlement, which exacts too little a price from banks for their wrongdoing and offers too little to homeowners.

The settlement provides that banks will spend $17 billion on principal reductions and another $3 billion on refinancings. But according to an analysis by the Brooking Institute’s Ted Gayer, less than 5 percent of the nation’s 11.1 million homeowners will qualify for help under the settlement.

It also presents the general laundry list of wrongdoing without any specificity – it names no names or specific facts. One of the big criticisms of the foreclosure settlement is that the authorities didn’t do a real law-enforcement style investigation to assemble a case before sitting down to “negotiate” the settlement, weakening their hand with the banks.

The second aspect of the foreclosure settlement that reveals its weakness is how the authorities are suggesting they’re going to monitor whether the banks will comply. Just exactly how are we going to make sure that the big banks deliver even the relatively small number of loan modifications and principal reductions they’ve promised?

According to the settlement, the banks themselves are going to self-report on their progress.

Then an “independent” monitoring committee is going to check these reports, and then levy fines if the banks aren’t hitting certain targets. But the monitors consist of the same regulators who have already facilitated the banks’ earlier failed foreclosure mitigation efforts, and have touted this current settlement as a “landmark.” Having already proved their reluctance to get tough on the banks so far, how much incentive do they have to get tough with banks later on?

It sounds flaky to me.

The whole robo-signing scandal stems from banks use of forged, false or unverified documents, poor recordkeeping and the inability of anybody in the courts or government to get the banks to follow the law or hold them accountable.

On top of that, when it comes to keeping their previous commitments to deliver loan modifications in earlier attempts to address the foreclosure crisis, the banks have failed miserably.  The investigative journalism outfit Pro Publica has assembled reams of data about the shortcomings of previous government-sponsored loan modification efforts.

So now we think it’s a good idea for them to police themselves?

The entire settlement looks more like the government’s latest efforts to prop up the nation’s floundering too big to fail banks than a real attempt at either law enforcement or robust help for homeowners and the housing market.

Where is Judge Rakoff when we really need him?

 

Foreclosure / Martin Column / Outrage / Too Big To Fail - 03/14/2012

All the President's Millionaires

While there’s some shuffling of desks close to President Obama, the most important factor isn’t changing ¬– the 1 percent is retaining a tight grip on the administration.

Exit Bill Daley (income from J.P. Morgan in 2010 = $8.7 million). Enter Jacob Lew (income from Citigroup in 2010 = $1.1 million). Lew was CEO of the Citigroup division that invested in credit default swaps, among other risky investments that sank the economy. But the bank, which survived only thanks to taxpayer generosity, paid Lew a $900,000 bonus.
Were they really paying him for overseeing the investments that nearly sank the bank – or were they compensating him for the work he did for the bank while he served in the Clinton administration, betting that Lew would serve again?
And who can forget Daley’s predecessor, Rahm Emanuel, who got paid $16.2 million during a 2 1/2/ year as an investment banker, and remained a hedge fund favorite?
Meanwhile, still firmly in place near President Obama’s ear as his closest outside adviser on creating jobs is Jeffrey Immelt, CEO of General Electric. The Center for Public Integrity’s i-watch news is out with a devastating investigation into how GE under Immelt lost more than $1 billion getting into the subprime loan business, ignoring its own whistleblowers who were trying to tell their bosses how the irresponsible pursuit of profits led to widespread fraud.
This is more than just inside baseball – with these people in charge of the Democrats and the Republicans as well, there’s little hope that the administration will come to grips with the foreclosure crisis – or hold bankers accountable for looting and tanking the economy. Only a huge public outcry, much larger than the Occupy has mustered so far, can hope to change that.

Martin Column / Occupy / Outrage / President Barack Obama - 01/09/2012

Around The Web: Nothing Natural About Financial Disaster

Maybe this is the one that will finally cause people to take to the streets.

The crack investigative journalists at Pro Publica and NPR’s Planet Money have uncovered the latest evidence of how the big bankers schemed to keep their bonuses and fees coming by creating a phony market for their mortgage-backed securities, which were tumbling in value as the housing market tanked in 2006.

The Pro Publica/NPR investigation shows how the bankers from Merrill-Lynch, Citigroup and other “too big to fail” financial institutions undermined a system of independent managers who were supposed to be evaluating the value of the securities. The banks simply browbeat the managers into buying their products rather than face losing the banks’ business.

Meanwhile, the bankers continued to make money off every deal, even though the rest of us paid a high price for their continued trafficking in complicated financial trash.

Then when the entire business unraveled in the financial collapsed, these bankers got a federal rescue and a return to profitability.

Pro Publica acknowledges it’s complex material, so they’ve accompanied their investigation with a cartoon and graphs to make it easier to understand.

My WheresOurMoney colleague Harvey Rosenfield wrote recently about the falseness of the claim that either Hurricane Katrina or the financial collapse were primarily natural disasters. The NPR/ProPublica investigation is yet more evidence that the bankers’ irresponsible self-dealing turned a downturn in the housing market into full-blown catastrophes.

Writing on his blog Rortybomb, Mike Konczai hones in on the stark contrast in the fate of the bankers and many of the rest of us:  “Remember that by keeping the demand artificially high for the housing market in the post-2005, these banks created its own supply of crap mortgages. These mortgages inflated and then crashed local housing prices. Meanwhile the biggest banks got tossed a lifeline and homeowners can’t even short sale their home much less have a bankruptcy judge that can set their mortgage to the market price with a large penalty. And everyone lines up to tell those people what ‘losers’ they are, how `irresponsible’ they’ve been for being pulled into becoming the artificial supply for artificially created demand of housing debt. What sad times we are living in.”

Meanwhile the SEC is supposedly investigating the self-dealing. We’re still waiting for the tougher new SEC that the Obama administration promised. In the latest indication that we may have to wait a while longer, a federal judge has rejected the agency’s proposed $75 million settlement with Citibank over charges that the bank misled its own shareholders about the shrinking value of its mortgage-backed securities. The SEC said the bank misled investors in conference calls by saying its subprime exposure was $13 billion, when it was actually more than $50 billion. Among the pointed questions the judge asked: Why should the shareholders have to pay for the misdeeds of the bank executives, and why didn’t the SEC go after more of the executives?

The judge’s questions about accountability mirror the uneasy questions a lot of us have about this administration’s reluctance to take on the bankers whose behavior led to ruin for the country while they profited.

Around the Web / Derivatives / Executive Pay / Martin Column / Outrage / Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) / Too Big To Fail / Uncategorized - 08/31/2010

Stuck in the Fog

One thing is clear: Citigroup executives thought they had a deal with the government to pay back their bailout money so they could pay themselves as much as they wanted.

Then it all started to unravel. The Washington Post disclosed that the IRS granted Citigroup huge tax breaks (meaning billions) as part of the exit strategy the "too big too fail" bank worked out with Treasury officials.

After that the stock market rejected the government and Citigroup’s assessment of the bank’s health and the deal fell through.

Goldman-Sachs / Martin Column / President Barack Obama - 12/17/2009