Underwater secrets

Local governments'  have often stirred controversy with their use of eminent domain. While it's supposed to be used for the public good, too often it has been used to profit developers, while the public just feels ripped off.

Still, the idea of local governments using eminent domain as a tool to stabilize home prices in some of Southern California’s hardest hit communities is an intriguing one.

It’s the kind of bold action that’s been missing in the government’s limp response to the foreclosure crisis.

But the scheme that’s unfolding in Southern California’s Inland Empire, rated as the one of the most underwater in the nation, is a step in the wrong direction.

It smacks of politically-connected high-finance types, boasting of their access to politicians as their “secret formula,” wheeling and dealing in secret.

A san Francisco venture capital firm is cooking up a scheme in San Bernardino to use the government’s eminent domain power to seize some underwater mortgages from investors who own them and have been unwilling to offer borrowers principal reduction that would allow them to stay in their homes.

The firm’s idea, apparently, is to for San Bernardino County and other local government’s form a joint powers authority that would allow those government to act together to use eminent domain to seize mortgage loans, not the property, of underwater homeowners who were not behind on their payments at “market value.”

Then, according to the scheme, the firm would find investors to issue new mortgages to the homeowners at that lower, more affordable “market value.”]

The plan was hatched by San Francisco-based Mortgage Resolution Partners. That’s the firm originally headed by Phil Angelides, former state treasurer, real estate developer and venture capitalist best known recently for leading a congressionally-appointed investigation into the financial crisis.

After issuing a report highly critical of the banks, Angelides didn’t stump the country to put pressure on authorities to follow up on his report with prosecutions.

He went into the mortgage business himself, swaddling his efforts to make profits from distressed mortgages in good intentions of finding solutions to the foreclosure crisis.

It was Angelides who boasted in a letter to potential investors that his firms’ secret formula was its connections to public officials. Reuters reported that Angelides told potential investors they could generate 20 percent profits.

After Angelides’ involvement in the firm was publicized earlier this year, he stepped aside. Replacing him was Steven Gluckstern, a hedge fund veteran who was one of President Obama’s major bundlers in the 2008 election.

According to published reports, Mortgage Partners would make its profit charging a fee on every mortgage seized. How much will it be paid and how? That hasn’t been disclosed. But according to Naked Capitalism, its sources say that the firm expects to make a 5.5 percent fee on each mortgage ­– paid for by having the government seize the mortgages at a discount and sell them back to the homeowner for a profit.

The most serious general flaw in the scheme is that has unfolded behind the cloak of confidentiality agreements between government officials and Mortgage Resolution Partners, with no public disclosure or debate on the concept or details, giving the whole deal the stink of a sweetheart deal, not a solution.

When the Riverside Press-Enterprise sought written records of communication between county officials and the mortgage firm, they were told there were none.

The use of eminent domain is highly controversial because it has often been justified as benefiting the public when it ends up benefiting real estate developers. In this case, investors who own the mortgage loans have already weighed in opposing the plan. Though the plan’s backers say eminent domain has been used to seize intangible goods, they acknowledge it hasn’t been used to seize mortgage loans before. So investors are likely to challenge the process in court.

But I wouldn’t shed too many tears for the investors, who have stood in the way of principal reductions or any other means of helping homeowners.

Another question raised by the current plan: why is only Mortgage Resolutions Partners being considered as a partner for the joint powers authority? The idea should be put out for an open bid. Maybe other firms would have even better plans and offer a better deal.

And there are plenty of other issues surrounding the plan. Walter Hackett is a former banker who is now lead attorney in the Legal Aid Riverside’s branch near San Bernardino. While he likes the idea of using eminent domain as a tool to stabilize home prices,

he questions why eminent domain would be used to seize mortgage loans – which are more difficult to set a price on – rather than property itself. Seizing the property and paying the investor for the fair market value of the property, rather than the mortgage, would extinguish the old mortgage and the new investors could then issue a new one to the borrower at the market value.

Hackett also questions why eminent domain would be used only on mortgages deemed current, so-called performing loans, rather than including properties that have already fallen into foreclosure that are still owned by investors. “Former owners, or others might be able to afford reduced payments once the properties are priced at market value, rather than at the price of the underwater mortgage,” Hackett said.

Hackett’s unusual background, having been a banker and represented homeowners in foreclosure, would be invaluable in redesigning such a proposal. It should not be left only to the venture capitalists and the county politicians.

I’m not suggesting that local governments shouldn’t find a way to use eminent domain or find other creative solutions to help struggling homeowners. But we also need to stop assuming that when the financiers and politicians go into the back room, they come out with something that’s in our interest – even if they say it is.

We learned from the bailout and the government’s subsequent coddling of the financial industry how the secrecy and lack of transparency undermine trust in both our financial system and our government.

However inconvenient to the bankers and hedge fund honchos, such proposals must be hammered out with full public participation and debate. We don’t need any more secret formulas” brewed with corporate cash and political connections in back rooms with you and me kept out.

 

 

High Court's Low Opinion of Foreclosure Practices

Apparently the Massachusetts Supreme Court neglected to read the bipartisan memo reminding politicians and judges to refrain from doing anything that might upset the banks.

Most judges have shown extraordinary deference to bankers, even amid growing evidence that those bankers haven’t been following the law in pursuing foreclosures.

That may be beginning to change, in the wake of a Massachusetts ruling against banks in a closely watched foreclosure case.

Right now the decision only has force in Massachusetts. But as other cases challenging foreclosures make their way through the courts across the country, other judges are likely to be guided by it. In addition, the ruling will also provide guidance for lawyers posing legal challenges to other mortgages scrambled in the securitization process.

The Obama administration has consistently downplayed evidence of rampant fraud and sloppiness in the way banks split up, packaged and sold off mortgages to investors in the heat of the housing bubble.

Almost all subprime mortgages as well as millions of conventional mortgages originated before the meltdown were securitized and sold to investors. Securitized mortgages account for more than half of the $14.2 trillion in the total outstanding U.S. mortgage debt.

Bankers have tried to dismiss these problems with what’s known as the securitization process as a matter of mixed-up paperwork that can be straightened out.

But the highest level court to examine the issue thus far took the issue much more seriously. Last week the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated what had become a common practice – banks seeking to foreclose on properties without properly holding ownership of the promissory note and mortgage as part of the securitization. The court  focused heavily on the use of the power of sale contained in mortgages; the same power exists in the vast majority of California deeds of trust.

Ruling in a closely watched case, the high court rejected arguments by U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co. that they didn’t have to prove their authority to foreclose. The banks had argued that evidence that they intended to transfer ownership was enough to establish their standing to foreclose.

The ruling makes dense but fascinating reading, with some passages coming through loud and clear even if you’re not steeped in real estate law.

The justices stressed they weren’t creating any new interpretation of law. “The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our statutes,” wrote Justice Ralph D. Gants. “All that has changed is the (banks) apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.”

Banks have argued that their “pooling and servicing agreements” allowed them to transfer mortgages to securitized trusts “in blank” without specifying whom the new owner would be.

But the justices ruled in U.S. Bank v. Ibanez that the “foreclosing party must hold the mortgage at the time of the notice and sale in order accurately to identify itself as the present holder and in order to have the authority to foreclose under the power of sale...”

In a concurring opinion, Justice Robert Cordy wrote: “There is no dispute that the mortgagors (borrowers) had defaulted on their obligations.”

But that’s not the legal standard. “Before commencing such an action...the holder of an assigned mortgage needs to take care to ensure that his legal paperwork is in order,” Cordy stated.

The ruling could lead to an increase in complicated and expensive litigation, if those whose homes have already been foreclosed on sue to challenge the financial institutions’ authority to conduct the foreclosures. Investors may also sue, contending that the banks didn’t properly document the ownership trail on the mortgages contained in a particular investment pool.

Can banks go back in and straighten out their securitization mess? So far the banks are downplaying the significance of the ruling. But untangling the paperwork may not be so easy. Many of the entities that created the securitized pools have gone bankrupt or dissolved into other businesses. At the very least, it could pose a costly and complicated process for the bankers, one that would entail taking a hard look at the details of the deals that led to the country’s financial collapse.

Wall Street's Back – And Has Detroit by The Throat

While financial institutions drastically reduce lending again to private lenders and businesses, they’re also tightening the vice on cash-strapped public agencies from California to New Jersey.

This aspect of the financial meltdown has gotten less attention than the bonuses and the bailouts: how AIG and other Wall Street giants sold cities, towns, school boards and other public agencies high-risk investments and complex financing schemes during the boom. Now that the economy, the government agencies’ credit ratings and all those risky investments have gone bust, Wall Street is hounding cash-strapped governments from California to New Jersey for its money.

If You Can't Explain it, You Can't Regulate it

Imagine if government officials who controlled some crucial aspect of our lives, say the war in Afghanistan, spoke about it in public only in another language.

Greek, say.

Only those who understood Greek would be able to talk about it or ask questions.

Now imagine that those who controlled the policy were unelected, appointed by a mysterious group of Greek-speaking weapons manufacturers whose business would benefit from the war.

Got it?

That’s about what we have in the U.S. Federal Reserve, a quasi-government agency that speaks in its own language, whose members are appointed by banks, and are not accountable to anybody else.

Never-Ending Bailout is Not a Partisan Issue

It would be hard to find two congressmen more politically opposite than Brad Sherman and Jeb Hensarling.

Sherman is solid Democrat from the San Fernando Valley in southern California. Hensarling is a red-meat Texas conservative protege of former senator Phil Gramm.

Sherman and Hensarling may not agree about anything else.

But the two men have been outspoken in one shared view: that the bailout known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP has lacked accountability or transparency from day one.