Underwater secrets

Local governments'  have often stirred controversy with their use of eminent domain. While it's supposed to be used for the public good, too often it has been used to profit developers, while the public just feels ripped off.

Still, the idea of local governments using eminent domain as a tool to stabilize home prices in some of Southern California’s hardest hit communities is an intriguing one.

It’s the kind of bold action that’s been missing in the government’s limp response to the foreclosure crisis.

But the scheme that’s unfolding in Southern California’s Inland Empire, rated as the one of the most underwater in the nation, is a step in the wrong direction.

It smacks of politically-connected high-finance types, boasting of their access to politicians as their “secret formula,” wheeling and dealing in secret.

A san Francisco venture capital firm is cooking up a scheme in San Bernardino to use the government’s eminent domain power to seize some underwater mortgages from investors who own them and have been unwilling to offer borrowers principal reduction that would allow them to stay in their homes.

The firm’s idea, apparently, is to for San Bernardino County and other local government’s form a joint powers authority that would allow those government to act together to use eminent domain to seize mortgage loans, not the property, of underwater homeowners who were not behind on their payments at “market value.”

Then, according to the scheme, the firm would find investors to issue new mortgages to the homeowners at that lower, more affordable “market value.”]

The plan was hatched by San Francisco-based Mortgage Resolution Partners. That’s the firm originally headed by Phil Angelides, former state treasurer, real estate developer and venture capitalist best known recently for leading a congressionally-appointed investigation into the financial crisis.

After issuing a report highly critical of the banks, Angelides didn’t stump the country to put pressure on authorities to follow up on his report with prosecutions.

He went into the mortgage business himself, swaddling his efforts to make profits from distressed mortgages in good intentions of finding solutions to the foreclosure crisis.

It was Angelides who boasted in a letter to potential investors that his firms’ secret formula was its connections to public officials. Reuters reported that Angelides told potential investors they could generate 20 percent profits.

After Angelides’ involvement in the firm was publicized earlier this year, he stepped aside. Replacing him was Steven Gluckstern, a hedge fund veteran who was one of President Obama’s major bundlers in the 2008 election.

According to published reports, Mortgage Partners would make its profit charging a fee on every mortgage seized. How much will it be paid and how? That hasn’t been disclosed. But according to Naked Capitalism, its sources say that the firm expects to make a 5.5 percent fee on each mortgage ­– paid for by having the government seize the mortgages at a discount and sell them back to the homeowner for a profit.

The most serious general flaw in the scheme is that has unfolded behind the cloak of confidentiality agreements between government officials and Mortgage Resolution Partners, with no public disclosure or debate on the concept or details, giving the whole deal the stink of a sweetheart deal, not a solution.

When the Riverside Press-Enterprise sought written records of communication between county officials and the mortgage firm, they were told there were none.

The use of eminent domain is highly controversial because it has often been justified as benefiting the public when it ends up benefiting real estate developers. In this case, investors who own the mortgage loans have already weighed in opposing the plan. Though the plan’s backers say eminent domain has been used to seize intangible goods, they acknowledge it hasn’t been used to seize mortgage loans before. So investors are likely to challenge the process in court.

But I wouldn’t shed too many tears for the investors, who have stood in the way of principal reductions or any other means of helping homeowners.

Another question raised by the current plan: why is only Mortgage Resolutions Partners being considered as a partner for the joint powers authority? The idea should be put out for an open bid. Maybe other firms would have even better plans and offer a better deal.

And there are plenty of other issues surrounding the plan. Walter Hackett is a former banker who is now lead attorney in the Legal Aid Riverside’s branch near San Bernardino. While he likes the idea of using eminent domain as a tool to stabilize home prices,

he questions why eminent domain would be used to seize mortgage loans – which are more difficult to set a price on – rather than property itself. Seizing the property and paying the investor for the fair market value of the property, rather than the mortgage, would extinguish the old mortgage and the new investors could then issue a new one to the borrower at the market value.

Hackett also questions why eminent domain would be used only on mortgages deemed current, so-called performing loans, rather than including properties that have already fallen into foreclosure that are still owned by investors. “Former owners, or others might be able to afford reduced payments once the properties are priced at market value, rather than at the price of the underwater mortgage,” Hackett said.

Hackett’s unusual background, having been a banker and represented homeowners in foreclosure, would be invaluable in redesigning such a proposal. It should not be left only to the venture capitalists and the county politicians.

I’m not suggesting that local governments shouldn’t find a way to use eminent domain or find other creative solutions to help struggling homeowners. But we also need to stop assuming that when the financiers and politicians go into the back room, they come out with something that’s in our interest – even if they say it is.

We learned from the bailout and the government’s subsequent coddling of the financial industry how the secrecy and lack of transparency undermine trust in both our financial system and our government.

However inconvenient to the bankers and hedge fund honchos, such proposals must be hammered out with full public participation and debate. We don’t need any more secret formulas” brewed with corporate cash and political connections in back rooms with you and me kept out.

 

 

The Never-Ending Bailout

Even though banks' super-charged profits and eye-popping bonuses are back, they want you to keep paying the costs of their foreclosures.

In California, where the foreclosure crisis has hit with brutal force, it will cost communities between $600 billion and $1 trillion in lost property value, almost $4 billion in lost property tax revenue, and over $17 billion in local government costs between 2008 and 2012, according to Ellen Reese, a University of California Riverside sociologist and Jan Breidenbach, who teaches housing policy at USC, writing in the San Bernardino Sun.

That amounts to be about $20,000 per foreclosure that local governments [meaning you] have to pay every time a bank forecloses on a home.

One California legislator has made a modest suggestion: have banks pay those costs at the time of the foreclosure, so taxpayers don’t have to absorb them later.

The way the banks have responded, you would think that the legislators had proposed seizing the banks and distributing the bankers’ money on Main Street.

The mortgage bankers’ association, in best fear-mongering fashion, told its members that making the banks pay the costs of their failed loans would dry up all future home lending in the state.

In her April 6 letter to her membership, the association’s president, Pam Sosa, doesn’t offer any suggestion how the costs banks are currently passing on to you and me could be mitigated.

Meanwhile the California Bankers’ Association says if the bill becomes law, they’ll simply pass the cost on to their customers.

Why should the banks have to pay when they’ve done such a stellar job convincing the politicians that you won’t mind picking up the tab for the bankers’ losses?

If you thought that the financial collapse would curtail the banks sense of entitlement to write their own rules for their business, you would be wrong.

If you thought that the financial collapse would have made the banks think twice before demanding that we pay the costs when their business goes south, their reaction to AB 935, sponsored by San Fernando Valley Democrat Bob Blumenfield, demonstrates that you would be wrong.

Of course, the real purpose behind AB 935 is not to get the banks’ money. It is provide more of a financial incentive to the banks to work out sustainable modifications that would allow homeowners to remain in their homes. The Obama administration’s Home Affordable Mortgage Program has had little success in encouraging banks to modify loans because in part, the incentives it offers to the banks are too small But the banks find it tough to make their case on the merits. They can’t argue they don’t have enough money to pay their own way. Instead they rely on fear tactics and the inside game, which has served them so well in getting legislators and regulators to water down efforts to crack down in the wake of the financial collapse. In the depths of the recession in California, at the same time bankers were collecting billions in bailout, they were spending $70 million in lobbying fees and campaign contributions to thwart or weaken legislation that would have protected homeowners in the foreclosure process.

Testifying earlier this week on behalf of AB 935, economist and blogger Mike Konczal described foreclosures as a “lose-lose situation.” A foreclosure fee that accurately covers the real costs the community will have to pay will encourage more sustainable modifications, he said. He also debunked the mortgage bankers’ argument that it would have an impact on new lending, because it will only be applied to already existing loans. Citing recent Federal Reserve statistics, Konczal said relatively few homeowners are actually walking away from their “under water” homes, “and are willing to pay to do right by their communities and their promises. It would be great to have a financial system that met them halfway."

But the banks disagreed. They fought back hard on AB 935. Late Tuesday, Peggy Mears of Alliance of Californians for Community Protection sent around an email to say that the legislation appeared to be dead for the year, stuck in legislative committee.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Letting Go Of Principals

After more than a year of ineffective attempts to stem the foreclosure crisis, the Obama administration this week may be edging toward acknowledging reality.

This sick housing market isn’t going to heal itself, and won’t get better with the band-aids they’ve applied so far. The stakes are high not just for the homeowners: without some stability in housing, the rest of the economy can’t heal either.

The administration announced today that it would begin to encourage banks to write down the principal when modifying borrower’s underwater mortgages. Bank of America also said this week it would tiptoe into principal reduction.

Time, and follow-through will tell whether the administration intends the principal write-downs as another band-aid or something more substantial. Time will also tell whether the administration will fight for write-downs or wilt in the face of the inevitable backlash. It’s also important to note that all of the administration’s foreclosure initiatives rely on the voluntary cooperation of lenders, with modest incentives paid by the government.

There is every reason for healthy skepticism of the administration and the banks’ ability to tackle the problem. As John Taylor, president of the National Reinvestment Coalition testified before a congressional panel this week: “We rush to give banks tax breaks, but we dawdle to help homeowners who through no fault of their own lost their jobs because of the economic crisis or bought defective loans that caused the economic crisis.”

Administration still won't rein in lavish pay schemes

Imagine if you could report the value of your work on your tax return, rather than your actual income. At the end of the year, you’d issue yourself a W2 or a 1099 based on a comparison of how other people who did the same kind of work valued their efforts. The lower the worth you put on your work, the lower your taxes. Let’s just say the IRS wouldn’t be too happy with a system that encouraged low-balling.

Wall Street bankers were able to arrange an equally self-serving compensation system for themselves - and they got away with it.